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Abstract
Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all
the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental
representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresenta-
tion, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends
teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that
teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresenta-
tion, but argues that this is not a problem for the views. This paper
clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and response to
Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do
need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.
Keywords: teleosemantics, representation, intentionality, misrepresenta-
tion, mental content
In “Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation”
(Mendelovici 2013), I argue that a certain prominent class of theories of men-
tal representation, tracking theories, have trouble allowing for what I call clean
cases of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a serious problem for them.
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In “Teleosemantics and reliable misrepresentation,” Marc Artiga (2013) provides
an interesting defense of teleosemantics from this argument. Artiga agrees that
teleosemantics cannot allow for the relevant kinds of clean cases of reliable mis-
representation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper
clarifies the argument from reliable misrepresentation (section 1) and addresses
Artiga’s objections (2). If I am right, then tracking theories really do need to
allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.
1 The argument from reliable misrepresentation
The argument from reliable misrepresentation against tracking theories pro-
ceeds in two steps: Step One argues that tracking theories are incompatible
with certain kinds of cases of reliable misrepresentation, clean cases of reliable
misrepresentation. Step Two argues that this is a problem for these views. This
section explains key notions and presents the two steps of the argument.
1.1 Key notions
Mental representation is the aboutness of mental states. A visual experience
might represent that there is a cup on the table, a thought might represent that
grass is green, and a desire might represent coffee, or that I obtain coffee.1 I will
assume that there are mental representations, which are are internal states that
are the bearers of representational properties. What a mental representation
represents is its content.
Tracking theories of mental representation are theories of mental represen-
tation that aim to account for mental representation in terms of causal or other
1My favored way of fixing on the phenomenon of mental representation is ostensive. See
Mendelovici MS: ch 1 and Mendelovici 2010: ch. 2. See Mendelovici MS: ch 1 for a defense
of the claim that other ways of picking out mental representation at least aim to include the
ostensively defined phenomenon.
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tracking relations between mental representations and properties, states of af-
fairs, or other items. My argument is aimed at tracking theories in general, but
Artiga is exclusively interested in defending teleosemantic tracking theories (see
Millikan 1984, Papineau 1987), and in particular something close to Millikan’s
(1984, 1989) version of the theory. My main aim is to respond to Artiga’s ar-
gument, so I will also focus on teleosemantics and a Millikan-esque version of
the theory as well. However, much of the discussion applies to tracking theories
more broadly.
Simplifying considerably, teleosemantics states that a representation R rep-
resents a content C if it is a normal condition for the systems that make use of R
(R’s consumers) to perform their proper functions that R corresponds to C. Let
us upack this a bit: Representations have producers (or senders) that produce
representations and consumers (or receivers) that respond to representations.
Producers and consumers might be systems in a single organism, or they might
occur in distinct organisms. An item or system’s proper function is what items
of its type did in its ancestors that resulted in their being selected for by evo-
lution. For example, although a heart may do many things (pump blood, make
noise, suffer certain kinds of blockages), it is its pumping blood that resulted
in its being selected, and so its proper function is to pump blood. In order for
something to perform its proper function in the way that it did that resulted in
its selection, certain conditions have to be in place; these are normal conditions.
The normal conditions for a heart performing its proper function include being
part of an intact organism and receiving oxygenated blood. Something might
perform its proper function while in conditions that are not normal (in other
words, in abnormal conditions); in this case, its success at performing its proper
function is in some sense accidental.
Like hearts, the consumers of representations have proper functions. It is a
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normal condition for them to perform their proper functions that they corre-
spond to certain states of affairs, which are their contents. Put otherwise, in
order for representation consumers to perform their proper functions in the way
that was selected for by evolution, a certain correspondence between representa-
tions and certain states of affairs had to be in place. Representations represent
whatever this correspondence maps them onto.2
A characteristic example discussed by Millikan is that of beaver tail splashes
(see, e.g., Millikan 1989). Beavers splash their tails to signal danger, which
leads to other beavers taking cover. A tail spash at a location at a time is a
representation, with the splashing beaver being the producer of the representa-
tion, and the onlooking beavers being the consumers of the representation. If a
beaver flees and there is danger, the consumer succeeds in performing its proper
function, which might be to avoid danger, in a normal way. If a beaver flees
and there is no danger, the consumer does not succeed in performing its proper
function in a normal way. The normal condition for the proper functioning of
the representation’s consumer is that there be a correspondence between the
location and time of a tail splash and the location and time of danger. So, a tail
splash at location l and at time t represents there is danger at location l and
time t. While beaver tail splashes are not examples of mental representations,
the same general principles apply to cases of mental representations.3
2A thorough development of Millikan’s teleosemantics can be found in Millikan 1984. See
also Millikan 1989 for an overview of some of the key ideas, and Shea 2004 for a lucid expla-
nation of the view.
3Millikan, and I assume other advocates of the version of teleosemantics that Artiga aims to
defend, rejects the view that propositional representations, representations representing entire
putative states of affairs, are built up out of subpropositional representations, representations
representing objects, properties, or other subpropositional contents (see, e.g., Millikan 1984:
107). Since normal conditions are entire states of affairs, the contents of mental representations
are, in the first instance, propositional. (Millikan rejects a language of thought picture (Fodor
1975). See Rupert 1999 for discussion.) However, she takes propositional representations
to have variant aspects and invariant aspects, aspects that do or do not vary, respectively,
between different representations in the same system. For example, a beaver tail splash is
a representation with a propositional form, representing the propositional content there is
danger at location l and time t, for some l and t. The representation is part of a system of
representations, a system of possible tail splashes, which have variant and invariant aspects,
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1.2 Reliable misrepresentation
It is generally agreed that a theory of mental representation must allow for
misrepresentation, representation that is false or inaccurate. In Mendelovici
2013: 423, I argue that just as we acknowledge hallucination, illusion, and occa-
sional misrepresentation as kinds of misrepresentation, we should also recognize
another kind of misrepresentation: reliable misrepresentation.
Intuitively, reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same
way all the time (Mendelovici 2013: 422). Reliable misrepresentations are not
just wrong; they are systematically wrong. Unlike hallucination and occasional
misrepresentation, reliable misrepresentation is reliable; it involves misrepre-
senting in the same way all the time. Unlike illusion, reliable misrepresentation
is not compatible with the overall veridicality of tokens of the representation in
question; tokens of the representation in question are never veridical.
For example, suppose color anti-realism is true and nothing is colored. Then,
color experiences reliably misrepresent. They represent that certain objects have
certain colors, are always nonveridical, and occur reliably in the same sets of
circumstances (e.g., ripe tomatoes tend to trigger representations of redness, a
clear daytime sky tends to trigger representations of blueness). Color experi-
ences get things wrong in the same way all the time. Similarly, suppose moral
anti-realism is true and nothing is right or wrong. Then, our representations of
rightness and wrongness reliably misrepresent. They represent that certain acts
are right or wrong, are always nonveridical, and occur reliably in the same sets
of circumstances (e.g., murders tend to be represented as wrong).
aspects that do and do not vary, respectively, between different representations in the system.
The particular location and time can vary, so the aspects of the representation corresponding
to location and time are variant aspects, while the representation of danger cannot vary and so
it is an invariant aspect (e.g., beaver tail splashes cannot represent the location of elephants,
rather than danger). These variant and invariant aspects play some of the same roles of
subpropositional representations, such as that of accounting for productivity. (See Martínez
2013 for discussion.) So, for simplicity of exposition, I will take the term “representation” to
cover these aspects.
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While I think reliable misrepresentation is a natural phenomenon whose
precise boundaries we might only hope to discover by empirically investigating
its similarities and differences to other nearby phenomena, I will attempt to
provide a more precise characterization of the phenomenon. Below is what
a take to be an improvement over my characterization in Mendelovici 2013,
discussion of which is relegated to a footnote.4
A representation R representing a property P reliably misrepresents for an
organism O if and only if
(RM1) R represents P . (Representation)
(RM2) All of O’s propositional representations that use R to ascribe P to
something are false. (Nonveridicality)
(RM3) Ascriptions of P using R reliably co-occur with the presence of some
type of state of affairs. (Reliability)
4In Mendelovici 2013 (p. 423), I characterized reliable misrepresentation as follows: An
organism’s representation of type R reliably misrepresents some property P if and only if
(RM1old) Some tokens of R are involved in attributive mental states that represent objects
as having property P ,
(RM2old) Most or all of the relevant objects do not have P ,
(RM3old) Tokens of R do or would nonveridically represent objects as having P in the same
types of circumstances on separate occasions.
The three clauses correspond to the three features of reliable misrepresentation: Represen-
tation, nonveridicality, and reliability. My proposed amended characterization impoves upon
this characterization as follows:
First, as Artiga (2013) rightly points out, (RM2old) is weaker than I intended, since it allows
the definition to include kinds of cases I do not want to call cases of reliable misrepresentation.
(This has also been suggested to me by Frédéric-Ismaël Banville in conversation.) For example,
suppose a representation R represents danger. Since, for many organisms, the cost of failing to
flee when there is danger is greater than the cost of fleeing when there is no danger, it would be
no surprise if such organisms would be set up so that most of R’s tokenings will be false alarms.
It might seem, then, that R would satisfy all the conditions for reliable misrepresentation. To
avoid this, as Artiga correctly suggests, “most or all” in (RM2old) should be changed to “all”
and calls the resulting notion that of “strong reliable misrepresentation.” However, it is not
clear to me that this case would satisfied the original definition, since it is not clear that the
false alarms would occur reliably. Presumably all sorts of things could trigger the false alarms,
so tokens of R would not tend to occur in the same circumstances. However, to avoid such
worries, I have taken Artiga’s friendly amendment on board.
Second, (RM3old) can be misread as stating that R is nonveridical in the same kinds of
circumstances, rather than as stating that R occurs and is nonveridical in the same kinds of
circumstances. My new characterization rules out this potential misreading.
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In short, a mental representation reliably misrepresents for an organism just in
case all its attributive uses in that organism are false and occur in the same
kinds of circumstances.
There are two points worth noting about this characterization: First, a
representation’s reliably misrepresenting for one organism is compatible with the
same representation not reliably misrepresenting for another organism. Suppose
that color anti-realism is true and there are no colored objects on Earth, but
there are colored objects on Colorful Earth, which is otherwise just like Earth.
In this case, color representations reliably misrepresent for me, but not for my
Colorful Earth twin.5
Second, a representation R’s reliably misrepresenting is compatible with its
occurrence in true propositional representations, so long as these propositional
representations do not ascribe the property R represents to anything. For exam-
ple, suppose again that color anti-realism is true and our color representations
reliably misrepresent. Still, a thought that red is more similar to orange than
it is to blue or that a particular object is not red might be true.
In the color case, reliable misrepresentation is systematic in a way that
is not captured by my characterization: Not only does the representation of
blue421 misrepresent whenever it is used attributively, but so too do related
representations of other colors. The whole system of color representations re-
liably misrepresents. Whether we want to build this into our characterization
of reliable misrepresentation is an interesting question. I take reliable misrep-
resentation to be a natural phenomenon, but it is unclear whether this kind of
systematicity would be a feature of this phenomenon (one reason to think it
might be is that it distinguishes reliable misrepresentation from certain kinds of
5I am characterizing reliable misrepresentation as a feature of types of representations that
they have relative to organisms that have their tokens. But we might, instead, take reliable
misrepresentation to be a feature of an organism’s set of tokens of a representation or ability
to token a representation.
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illusions—see fn. 8). In any case, it seems that the prime examples of reliable
misrepresentation are systematic in this way too.
1.3 Step One of the argument
We are now in a position to overview the argument from reliable misrepresenta-
tion against tracking theories. Step One of the argument argues that tracking
theories of mental representation cannot allow for clean cases of reliable misrep-
resentation that are supposed to get their contents from tracking.6
Clean cases of reliable misrepresentation are cases of reliable misrepresenta-
tion that exhibit the likely features of reliable misrepresentation (Mendelovici
2013: 429). Since reliable misrepresentations are reliable, they are likely to be
useful for their bearers, stable across generations, and such that they are tokened
as a result of a robust causal connection, so clean cases of reliable misrepresenta-
tion have these features. However, this list of features is not meant to provide a
complete characterization of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. In getting
a clearer idea of the notion, it is helpful to keep examples of putative clean cases
in mind, such as that of perceptual color representations on the assumption of
color anti-realism: Perceptual color representations form a system of represen-
tations, all of which misrepresent, occur reliably in the same circumstances on
multiple occasions, but are useful for their bearers, stable across generations,
and robustly causally connected to surface reflectance profiles. There is nothing
“fluky” or contrived about this case. As we will soon see, it does not matter
for the argument that the notion of a clean case of reliable misrepresentation
is fuzzy, since, as long as there are cases of reliable misrepresentation that a
tracking theory inappropriately rules out, the theory is in trouble. So this un-
6Note that this allows that there can be clean cases of reliable misrepresentation of repre-
sentations that are not supposed to get their contents from tracking, e.g., representations that
are supposed to get their content compositionally. I set aside such cases in what follows. Step
One claims that some representations that are supposed to get their contents from tracking
are clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.
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derstanding of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation will suffice for present
purposes.
While various tracking theories can allow for cases of reliable misrepresen-
tation, the kinds of cases they can allow for are unclean in various ways. In
the case of teleosemantics, reliable misrepresentation can occur in cases where
our environment has changed from that of our ancestors. Suppose that our
ancestors had an internal state, R, that co-occurred with the presence of items
having property P and that this was helpful for our ancestors’ survival and
reproduction, so R represents the presence of P . Suppose, further, that P is
part of a system of representations exhibiting variant and invariant aspects,
and r is an invariant aspect corresponding to the property P . r would then
represent P . But suppose now that our environment has changed since the time
of our ancestors and there no longer are any Ps. Suppose also that r’s mis-
representation is reliable; representations with aspect r occur regularly in some
circumstances, say, in the presence of the property Q. We now have a case of
reliable misrepresentation that is compatible with teleosemantics.
However, this setup tends to be unstable: selective pressure turns this case
of reliable misrepresentation into a case of reliable veridical representation in
subsequent generations. Since mere reliability tends to be useful for survival and
reproduction (see Mendelovici 2013: 428-9), r’s co-occurring with P is likely to
be helpful to our survival and reproduction, and so, in subsequent generations,
representations involving r will come to represent the instantiation of Q, and r
itself with come to represent Q. Which descendants will be affected will depend
on when selective pressure kicks in to preserve or change the proper function of
the consumers of representations involving r, but as soon as such selection takes
place, r comes to represent Q rather than P . The kind of reliable misrepresen-
tation that teleosemantics can allow is unstable, giving way to reliable veridical
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representation in one’s descendants. Thus, although teleosemantics can allow
for reliable misrepresentation, it cannot allow for clean cases of reliable mis-
representation. Similar kinds of arguments show that other kinds of tracking
theories cannot allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.7
7An anonymous reviewer suggests another way in which teleosemantics can allow for re-
liable misrepresentation. As noted above, it is possible for something to perform its proper
function in abnormal conditions, or “by accident.” This involves performing its proper func-
tion by doing something other than what its ancestors did that led to its being selected. To
borrow an example from Millikan, a chameleon’s pigment-changing mechanism might have
the proper function of altering the chameleon’s skin pattern to match what it sits on. A
normal condition for its proper functioning is that it in fact matches what it sits on. But
a chameleon’s pigment-changing mechanism might still perform its proper function without
matching what it sits on; it might cause the chameleon to stand in such stark contrast to
its surroundings that a passerby feels sorry for it and moves it to a matching surface. The
chameleon’s pigment-changing mechanism performed its proper function, but not in the way
that its ancestors did. It performed it “by accident.”
Similarly, a representation’s consumer can perform its proper function in abnormal con-
ditions. If the environment changes such that normal conditions no longer ever obtain but
abnormal conditions do sometimes obtain, a representation’s consumer might continue to
perform its proper function in these abnormal conditions. The suggestion is that the rep-
resentation would then reliably misrepresent—all its instances would be false and occur in
the same abnormal conditions. If there is no selective pressure against this setup, future
generations might also come to have the same representation that reliably misrepresents.
However, in order for this to be a case of reliable misrepresentation, the representation would
have to occur in the same abnormal conditions on multiple occasions. While it is possible
that it does, it seems more likely that the representation would occur in all sorts of different
conditions, and that, while sometimes its consumers will “get lucky” and perform their proper
functions “by accident,” in most cases they will not perform their proper functions at all.
Consider again the lucky chameleon. Suppose the chameleon’s environment changes and all
the surfaces it can access are colors it cannot match. There are some surfaces it can match, but
it can only access them by being placed there by a human being. The chameleon’s pigment-
changing mechanism can still perform its proper function, but only in abnormal conditions in
which a human being feels pity for it and moves it to a matching surface. But, unless there
happen to be sympathetic bystanders attending to it when required, its pigment-changing
mechanism will sometimes change colors and not perform its proper function at all.
In order for the anonymous reviewer’s case to be one of reliable misrepresentation, the
representation in question will have to occur regularly in the abnormal conditions. But then if
it occurs regularly in the abnormal conditions, and if its occurring regularly in these conditions
helps its consumers perform their proper functions, then it is likely that natural selection
will favor preserving the consumers’ behaviors, and the abnormal conditions will become the
normal conditions for proper functioning in future generations. Since representations represent
the normal conditions for their consumers’ proper functioning, the representation in future
generations will no longer reliable misrepresent, but reliably veridically represent these new
normal conditions. In short, the setup would be unstable.
Returning to the case of the chameleons, suppose that in the new environment, there are in
fact sympathetic bystanders constantly attending to the chameleons. The pigment-changing
mechanism is now useful to chameleons because it changes their skin to a pity-inducing color,
which causes humans to move it to safety. But since the mechanism’s behavior is useful, it
is likely that selective pressure would help preserving it in future generations. As a result,
the present generation’s abnormal conditions for the proper functioning of the mechanism will
become some future generations’ normal conditions. The case is unstable.
Finally, even if the case of reliable misrepresentation were stable across generations, it would
be unclean in other ways. For one, it requires consumers to perform their proper functions “by
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The tracking theory’s inability to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepre-
sentation arises from the fact that tracking theories peg veridicality to various
kinds of nonsemantic success, kinds of success distinct from veridicality. In
the case of teleosemantics, a token representation is nonsemantically successful
when it occurs in the same conditions that our ancestors found themselves in
when the representation was useful for survival and reproduction. This does not
mean that failure to be nonsemantically successful requires failure of a represen-
tation’s consumers to perform their proper functions, but rather that the normal
conditions for performing their proper functions do not obtain, so that if they
do perform their proper functions, they do so “accidentally.” Unfortunately, for
representations that are supposed to get their contents directly from tracking,
the conditions in which a representation is nonsemantically successful are of the
same type as the conditions that fix the content of the representation, so it is im-
possible to misrepresent in nonsemantically successful conditions. This means
that whenever misrepresentation occurs, something nonsemantic has to have
gone wrong. Representations are never just nonveridical; they are nonveridical
and unsuccessful in some other way as well. The problem with clean cases of
reliable misrepresentation is that nothing nonsemantic has gone wrong. Clean
cases of reliable misrepresentation are useful, stable, and the result of a robust
causal relation. Apart from being false, they are perfectly well-behaved. Since
tracking theories require misrepresentation to be accompanied by a nonsemantic
defect, and since clean cases of reliable misrepresentations are nonsemantically
successful, tracking theories cannot allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresen-
accident,” which is very unlike the prime example of a clean case of reliable misrepresentation,
that of the reliable misrepresentation of colors.
Relatedly, we should accept that there are other cases of unclean reliable misrepresentation
apart from those described. For example, suppose, for some fluky reason, there is never nectar
in a certain direction d of any bee hive. Then bee dances “stating” that there is nectar in
direction d will misrepresent. Suppose further that there is an environmental condition that
reliably causes bees to dance dances “stating” there is nectar in direction d. Then the bees’
representation of d will reliably misrepresent, but this will not be a clean case of reliable
misrepresentation.
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tation.
1.4 Step Two of the argument
Step Two of the argument argues that it is a problem for tracking theories that
they cannot allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. This is because
a theory of mental representation should allow for clean cases of reliable misrep-
resentation. Reliable misrepresentation is a kind of misrepresentation, just like
hallucination, illusion, and occasional misrepresentation. Just as it would be
inappropriate for a theory of mental representation to allow for only contrived
cases of these other kinds of misrepresentation, it would be inappropriate for
such a theory to allow for only unclean cases of reliable misrepresentation. In
Mendelovici 2013: 436, I claim that it is clear from a pretheoretical perspective
that a theory of mental representation should allow for clean cases of reliable
misrepresentation, but I also offer two further considerations that support the
claim.
The psychological consideration. The first consideration is that allowing
for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation offers us the resources needed to
make good sense of certain kinds of cases in which a representation helps us
perform various tasks involving the discrimination and re-identification of ob-
jects, but is also involved in various mistaken inferences. For example, our
representations of heaviness allow us to discriminate between objects of differ-
ent weights and to re-identify objects based on how heavy they feel. However,
our representations of heaviness lead to some mistaken inferences, such as that
an object that is difficult to lift on Earth will also be difficult to lift on the moon.
An appealing explanation of this pattern of reactions and inferences is that our
perceptual representations of heaviness reliably misrepresent: they represent an
intrinsic property of objects but reliably track a relational property holding be-
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tween objects and other objects. It is an open empirical question whether this
is the correct story of representations of heaviness; however, it is quite plausi-
ble that some representations might warrant such a treatment. This possibility
should not be foreclosed on the basis of a theory of mental representation.
The metaphysical consideration. The second consideration in favor of al-
lowing for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation is that failure to do so leads
to surprising and unwarranted metaphysical conclusions, such as realism about
various represented properties. The tracking theory licenses inferences from the
fact that we represent P in nonsemantically successful conditions to realism
about P , where realism about P is the view that P is instantiated. For ex-
ample, if we represent colors in nonsemantically successful conditions, then the
tracking theory allows us to conclude that color realism is true. In other words,
the tracking theory entails the following conditional for any content P that we
represent by tracking:
(REAL) If P is represented in nonsemantically successful conditions, then
realism about P is true.
(REAL) is a consequence of any theory of mental representation that doesn’t
allow for misrepresentation in nonsemantically successful conditions. The prob-
lem is that (REAL) is false. Accepting it is incompatible with the normal ways
in which we think we should settle questions of realism. In cases where the
existence or non-existence of P is contingent, we normally think that in order
to decide on realism about P , we should figure out what would count as an P
and then check the world for evidence of P . In cases in which the existence of P
is supposed to be necessary or a priori, different methods apply; for instance, we
might consider whether P plays certain theoretical roles that cannot be played
by anything else. But (REAL) allows us to bypass these usual methods. We
13
can tell that the antecedent of (REAL) is satisfied without figuring out what
would count as a P is and checking the world for signs of P , or employing other
normal methods for finding out about P . All we have to do is check ourselves
for experiences of P and check to see if those experiences are nonsemantically
successful. But this makes establishing realism too easy.
One way to summarize the two considerations is this: Tracking theories inap-
propriately prejudge certain empirical questions, questions concerning certain
psychological and metaphysical facts. This is inappropriate in part because,
despite being touted as “naturalistic” and in line with scientific world views,
tracking theories are often established without investigating the psychological
and metaphysical facts they prejudge.
Above, I noted that there is some fuzziness in the notion of a clean case of
reliable misrepresentation. But we can now see why this does not affect the
argument: The problem is not so much that tracking theories cannot allow any
instances of a general category of misrepresentation, but that there are such
instances that they should not disallow.
2 Response to objections
This section overviews and responds to various objections recently made in
Artiga 2013. Artiga mainly agrees with Step One of my argument.8 His dis-
8Artiga presents the case of the Ebbinghaus illusion as an example of reliable misrepresen-
tation that teleosemantics can account for, although he does not claim this is a clean case of
reliable misrepresentation, and so he does not take this to challenge Step One of my argument.
While I agree with Artiga that teleosemantics can account for this case, it is not clear to me
that it is a case of reliable misrepresentation at all. Artiga writes:
[I]n the best-known version of the Ebbinghaus illusion, two circles of identical
size are placed near to each other and one is surrounded by large circles while
the other is surrounded by small circles; the first central circle then appears
smaller than the second central circle. In this case, the selection and existence
of a mechanism producing representations of size is explained by the fact that
most of the time it produces the right representations. Nevertheless, there is a
representation type R (the state that misrepresents the size of [the] inner circle
14
agreements are with Step Two.
in the Ebbinghaus scenario) that reliably and systematically misrepresents a
certain configuration. This state R, which reliably misrepresents an inexistent
size of certain circles, is a by-product of the representational system that has
earned its keep in evolution. This is a sort of case involving strong reliable
misrepresentation that can be perfectly accommodated within teleosemantics.
(2013: 270-1, footnote suppressed)
There are two ways of understanding what Artiga takes R to represent. On one interpre-
tation, R represents “the size of [the] inner circle,” (271) but on another interpretation, R
represents “a certain configuration” (271). On the first reading, R is not a case of reliable
misrepresentation, since many occurrence of the representation of the particular size in ques-
tion are veridical. For example, a circle outside the context of an Ebbinghaus illusion might
trigger a representation of a circle as being that size. On the second interpretation, R is a
representation of the entire configuration of the inner and outer circles. Now, R should not
be a propositional representation to the effect that there is such-and-such arrangement of
circles, since the characterization of reliable misrepresentation only applies to representations
of properties. Instead, it should represent a property that captures the arrangement of circles.
For example, perhaps R represents a property attributed to space, that of containing such
and such an arrangement of circles. Or perhaps R represents a property attributed to sets of
objects, that of being circles arranged in such and such way. Then, one might argue, R, which
represents some such property, misrepresents every time it is tokened in a particular individual
and satisfies the other conditions on reliable misrepresentation. However, I don’t think it’s
clear that we have representations that represent such properties. While it is plausible that
the representational states we have while viewing the Ebbinghaus illusion involve a representa-
tion representing the size of the inner circle, representations representing the size of the outer
circles, and a representation that there are such and such circles standing in such and such
relations before us, it is not clear that we also count as having a representation correspond-
ing to the composite properties discussed above. This would require that the representations
representing the sizes of the inner circle and the outer circles come together in a way that
qualifies them as a further representation without thereby representing an entire proposition.
This would be analogous to a beaver’s tail splash representing danger at location l and time t
involving a representation or aspect representing l and t. It is an empirical question whether
we have such a representation (or aspect of a representation), but I am doubtful.
A better example of a persistent illusion that might be a case of reliable misrepresentation
is the experience of the Penrose triangle, since in this case it is more plausible that we have
a single representation representing an (impossible) shape property. However, this kind of
case is very different from paradigm cases of reliable misrepresentation, and might, at best,
point to an inadequacy of the characterization of reliable misrepresentation. In paradigm
cases of reliable misrepresentation, such as the case of color, misrepresentation is not merely
a special case of a system of representations that might be otherwise generally veridical, but
is instead a feature of the core cases of the system of representations. Additionally, if reliable
misrepresentation is to be contrasted with illusions, then illusions should not generally qualify
as cases of reliable misrepresentation.
A further condition that we might add to the characterization of reliable misrepresentation
to rule out persistent illusions is the requirement that all representations of properties in a
system of representations satisfy the first three conditions of reliable misrepresentation (see
p. 7). Alternatively, we could say that this is not a clean case of reliable misrepresentation,
perhaps on the basis of the fact that it is an isolated case of misrepresentation in an otherwise
generally veridical system.
In any case, it does not really matter if persistent illusions are clean cases of reliable misrep-
resentation, since Artiga and I agree that, regardless of how they are classified, they are cases
that teleosemantics can accommodate, and also that there are other cases that teleosemantics
cannot accommodate. Our disagreement is over whether it is problematic that teleoseman-
tics cannot accommodate the latter cases, not over whether some other cases that it can
accommodate should be classified as the same type of case on some method of classification.
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That’s just what the theory says! Artiga writes:
I agree [that the possibility of stable cases of reliable misrepresen-
tation] is certainly ruled out by teleosemantics; according to the
theory, R represents Q iff Q causally explains the selection of the
mechanism producing R. However, that does not seem to be an un-
welcome result, but just a different way of stating the theory. If R
represents whatever feature explains its selection, it cannot happen
that a feature explains its selection and it is not represented by R.
Why should that be a problem? (2013: 273)
I’m not sure if the teleosemanticist needs to say that represented properties
causally explain the selection of the mechanisms producing the representation
in question, but I do agree that she is committed to represented properties play-
ing some causal role in selecting for a representation’s producing or consuming
systems. I’m also not sure that teleosemantics needs to be committed to pro-
viding necessary and sufficient conditions for mental representation, rather than
just sufficient conditions that apply to us. But these quibbles are inconsequen-
tial to Artiga’s point, which is just that the impossibility of clean cases of reliable
misrepresentation is part of what teleosemantics says. It’s not an objection to
a theory that it says what it says.
Artiga also puts the point in a different way:
Every theory, teleosemantics a fortiori, is such that whatever meets
the sufficient conditions for being an F according to a theory is
an F according to the theory. . . In teleosemantics, those sufficient
conditions involve a process of reliability and stability for a period
sufficient for selection of the sender-receiver configuration. Conse-
quently, it is certainly true that teleosemantics rules out a case in
which Q is the property that accounts for the selection of R and R
16
does not represent Q. . . (2013: 273)
Although Artiga does not put things in quite this way, one way to understand
his complaint is as being that the objectionable consequence of teleosemantics
(its inability to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation) is an imme-
diate consequence of the theory, and objecting to a theory on the basis of its
immediate consequences is question-begging, since it would not convince anyone
who accepts the theory.
It is true that the failure to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresen-
tation is a consequence of teleosemantics. It is also true that it is possible
to reformulate teleosemantics and the conditions in which the relevant kinds
of clean cases of reliable misrepresentation occur such that this consequence
can be recognized fairly immediately. Perhaps, on some ways of understanding
teleosemantics and on some ways of understanding the allegedly problematic
consequence, teleosemantics and the problematic consequence are equivalent.
However, this is neither here nor there. A consequence of a theory is a conse-
quence of a theory, no matter how immediate or how obvious it is on various
formulations of the theory and the consequence. The question that should con-
cern us is whether the consequence is acceptable. In Step Two of my argument,
I offer specific reasons for thinking that the consequence is unacceptable. One
reason is that it precludes certain kinds of explanations of certain patterns of re-
actions and inferences. Another reason is that it warrants certain inappropriate
metaphysical conclusions. Another, fairly flat-footed, but I think compelling,
reason is that reliable misrepresentation is a type of misrepresentation, just like
occasional misrepresentation, hallucination, and illusion, and insofar as a theory
should allow for uncontrived cases of any kind of misrepresentation, it should
allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. The mere fact that some
claim is a consequence, or even a direct consequence, of a theory does not make
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it immune from criticism.
Objection to the psychological consideration. Artiga (2013: 274, fn. 5)
addresses the psychological reason for allowing for clean cases of reliable mis-
representation. The claim from Mendelovici 2013 under dispute is that reliable
misrepresentation might be the best explanation of certain patterns of reac-
tions and inferences, so we should not rule out the possibility of this sort of
explanation on the basis of a metaphysical theory of mental representation. Ar-
tiga objects that, since certain (unclean) cases of reliable misrepresentation are
allowed by teleosemantics, this form of explanation is not in fact ruled out.
All this is true. However, the relevant kind of explanation is only allowed in
cases involving instability, that is, cases in which the relevant patterns do not
persist over enough generations for there to be the kind of selective pressure
that could confer a change in content to the representation in question. In
stable cases, cases in which the relevant patterns persist over generations in the
relevant way, the patterns cannot be explained in the way I describe. Since
the reasons for wanting to allow for the kinds of explanations I describe have
nothing to do with instability, it is inappropriate to restrict their application to
unstable cases.
The allegedly inappropriate metaphysical consequences are just fine
if we assume teleosemantics. Artiga takes issue with the metaphysical
consideration in favor of allowing for reliable misrepresentation. Recall that my
worry is that tracking theories entail (REAL).
(REAL) P is represented in nonsemantically successful conditions, then re-
alism about P is true. (From a tracking theory)
The problem is that (REAL) licenses inappropriate inferences from claims that
we represent P in nonsemantically successful conditions to realism about P ,
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which is in tension with how we generally think we can and cannot settle ques-
tions of realism.
Artiga agrees that the tracking theory licenses such inferences, but disagrees
that this is a problem if we assume teleosemantics.
In teleosemantics ‘P is represented in non-semantically successful
conditions’ should be spell[ed] out as the claim that P was the prop-
erty that accounted for the selection of the sender-receiver system.
Hence, the problem should be cashed out as follows: if teleoseman-
tics is right and P is the property that accounts for the existence
and selection for the system, then one is committed to the (past)
existence of P. Again, this conditional seems true, but also entirely
plausible. If a property P accounted for the existence of the represen-
tational system, P must have been instantiated somewhere. (2013:
275, footnote suppressed)
Artiga offers further reasons for thinking that it is okay to assume that rep-
resented properties were instantiated, which I will turn to shortly. But let us
consider this argument first. Artiga is claiming that, from the perspective of
the teleosemanticist, the allegedly unwarranted inference that is licensed by
the tracking theory is in fact entirely warranted. This is because the teleose-
manticist understands the antecedent of (REAL) as equivalent to “P was the
property that accounted for the selection of my sender-receiver system,” which
makes (REAL) equivalent to (REAL′).9
(REAL′) If P was the property that accounted for the selection of my sender-
receiver system, then realism about P is true.10
9The teleosemanticist has room to deny that “P is represented in non-semantically suc-
cessful conditions” is equivalent to “P was the property that accounted for the selection of
the sender-receiver system” if she claims to only provide sufficient conditions for mental rep-
resentation and not necessary conditions or if she weakens the modal strength of her theory,
but I set this aside for now and assume that the teleosemanticist accepts this equivalence.
10For present purposes, we can assume that the past existence of P is sufficient for realism
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While (REAL) seems to be in tension with our ordinary ways of finding out
whether realism is true, (REAL′) does not. However, this does nothing to show
that (REAL) is unproblematic. This is because (REAL′) does not have the
objectionable features of (REAL); it does not commit itself to a questionable
connection between what we represent in nonsemantically successful conditions
and realism.
The situation is analogous to the following: Suppose the I’m Psychic Theory
claims that I imagine something iff it’s true. This theory entails (PSYCH):
(PSYCH) If I imagine that P , then P .
One might object to (PSYCH) in various ways; for one, it is incompatible with
how we normally think we can come to know about future events. Normally, we
predict the future on the basis of present events and theories about what kinds of
events they might give rise to. But (PSYCH) allows me to bypass such tedious
methods and predict the future solely based on what I imagine, which may have
no causal connection to the alleged future events I predict. According to the
I’m Psychic Theory, however, I imagine something iff it’s true. So “I imagine
that P” is equivalent to “P ,” and (PSYCH) is equivalent to (PSYCH′):
(PSYCH′) If P , then P .
(PSYCH′) is clearly true and has no objectionable epistemological consequences.
But this does nothing to show that (PSYCH) is true and similarly unobjection-
able. (REAL) and (PSYCH) serve as bridge premises linking claims about
representation and imagination, on the one hand, and claims about realism and
truth, on the other. But (REAL′) and (PSYCH′) are not bridge premises; they
operate only on one side of the relevant chasm, the realism/truth side. So,
about P . However, if the antecedent of (REAL′) is suitably cashed out so as to fully capture
the commitments of the antecedents of (REAL) assuming teleosemantics, it would also state
or entail that my sender-receiver system is stable in the relevant way and that I have tokens
of the internal states tracking P . This would entail the present instantiation of P .
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(REAL′) and (PSYCH′) do not have the objectionable features of (REAL) and
(PSYCH). We can see this clearly by noting that (REAL′) makes no mention
of mental representation and (PSYCH′) makes no mention of imagination.
Innately represented properties must have been instantiated in the
past. In his paper, Artiga argues that the following principle is true:
(PAST) If a property P is innately represented, P was instantiated in the
past.
The argument for (PAST) proceeds by attempting to show that (PAST) receives
widespread and legitimate endorsement by scientists and philosophers. If it is
unobjectionable to assume (PAST), this might motivate the claim that (REAL)
is unobjectionable independently of Artiga’s previous argument. The problem,
however, is that there is little reason to think that (PAST) receives widespread
and legitimate endorsement.
As an example of the endorsement of (PAST) in philosophy, Artiga cites an
objection to Fodor’s (1975) concept nativism:
Some people have suggested that human concepts like carburetor
or television cannot be innate because if they were, we would have
to accept that there were carburetors and televisions at the time our
ancestors evolved (Sterelny 1989; Prinz 2002: 229). (p. 275)
However, this is not in fact the argument that Sterelny and Prinz make. They
argue that concepts like carburetor are not innate as follows: Innate repre-
sentations have to be selected for. In order for a representation to be selected
for, it has to have been useful to our ancestors. But concepts like carburetor
would not have been useful to our ancestors. So, they could not have been
selected for. So, they are not innate.11 Sterelny and Prinz’s line of argument
11Prinz writes: “If prevailing theories of evolution are true, innate representational resources
21
does not assume (PAST).
Sterelny and Prinz’s argument is more compelling than Artiga’s suggested
reconstrual. The problem with thinking that carburetor was selected for
is not that there were no carburetors in our ancestors’ environment, but that
the concept carburetor would have been useless for our ancestors. Now,
perhaps part of the reason why the concept would have been useless for our
ancestors is that there were no carburetors, but this is neither here nor there.
The concept could have been useless even if there were carburetors (indeed, it
is arguably useless to many people who have it today), and the concept could
have been useful even if there were no carburetors (Mendelovici 2013 offers
examples of such cases). Usefulness and accuracy can come apart, and it’s
usefulness that matters for selection, not accuracy (except insofar as accuracy
confers usefulness).
As an example of the endorsement of (PAST) in science, Artiga presents
the debate over the innateness of a fear of spiders. A consideration against the
claim that a fear of spiders is innate is that only a small percentage of spiders
are poisonous, and so a fear of spiders would not confer a significant selective
advantage and would not have been selected for. Thus, it is not innate. Artiga
takes this line of argument to assume (PAST). But it clearly does not for the
same reason that Sterelny and Prinz’s arguments do not assume (PAST). What
is required for a fear of spiders to be selected for is that it is useful to our
ancestors, not that it represents accurately. A representation’s usefulness and
accuracy can come apart, allowing for useful inaccurate representations and
accurate useless representations.
must be either selected for or generated as an accidental by-product of things that were selected
for. A concept like spatula could not have been selected for, because it would have conferred
no survival advantage in the environments in which humans evolved.” (2002: 229)
Similarly, Sterelny writes: “innate concepts require a selective explanation; an explanation
showing that very concept conferred a reproductive advantage on our ancestors.” (1989: 123,
emphasis in original)
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In summary, Artiga’s arguments for the claim that (PAST) receives widespread
and legitimate endorsement among philosophers and scientists are unsuccessful.
As I’ve argued, considered endorsement of (PAST) is neither widespread nor
legitimate.12
We don’t know what we represent through introspection. In Mende-
lovici 2013, I provide a specific example of the kind of argument (REAL) li-
censes:
(P1) I represent redness. (Introspective observation)
(P2) My representations of redness occur in nonsemantically successful
conditions. (Uncontroversial empirical assumption)
(REAL) If P is represented in nonsemantically successful conditions, then
realism about P is true. (From a tracking theory)
(C) Therefore, realism about redness is true.
Importantly, both (P1) and (P2) can be known without examining the world for
traces of redness. (P1) can be known through introspection, and (P2) can be
known through examination of the usefulness, stability, and robustness of our
representation. We can assume that the tracking theorist accepts that we can
also know that a tracking theory is true, and hence that (REAL) is true, without
12Although Artiga’s paper suggests that the principle he aims to defend is (PAST), in
conversation, he has suggested a weaker principle:
(PAST-weak) If a property P is innately represented, P is likely to have been instantiated in
the past.
The claim that (PAST-weak) receives legitimate and widespread endorsement is more plau-
sible. However, this wouldn’t help the teleosemanticist, since (PAST-weak) is too weak to
legitimize (REAL). (REAL) does not claim that realism about properties represented in non-
semantically successful conditions is likely to be true, but rather that realism about such
properties is true.
In summary, neither appeal to (PAST) or (PAST-weak) succeed at legitimizing teleoseman-
tics’ commitment of (REAL).
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examining the world for redness.13 The worry, then, is this: The tracking theory
allows us to move from an introspective observation and an uncontroversial
empirical claim to realism about redness, without even requiring us to examine
the world for redness. This is incompatible with our ordinary ways of settling
questions of realism.
Artiga agrees that teleosemantics allows one to move from (P1) and (P2)
to (C), but maintains that this is unobjectionable. He suggests that I think
that (P1) and (P2) are a priori and that this is precisely what bothers me.14
But this is not what I think and this is not what bothers me. Nowhere do I
say that (P2) or (P2) are a priori.15 (P1) is a posteriori because it is known
through experience, even though the relevant experience is introspection.16 (P2)
13David Bourget has suggested to me that the tracking theorist could respond that we are
not in a position to know that (REAL) is true without first determining that realism about
properties represented in nonsemantically successful conditions is true. If this is right, then it is
not problematic that (REAL) licenses a move from (P1), (P2) to (C), since properly justifying
(REAL) requires already knowing the truth of (C). This is an interesting line of response
on behalf of the tracking theorist, though, as Bourget points out, it comes with unfortunate
consequences. It would mean that tracking theories have been accepted on inadequate evidence
all along. In order to properly justify a tracking theory, it is not enough to show that it
adequately accounts for cases of beavers, frogs, magnetotactic bacteria, and even some cases
of beliefs and desires; the tracking theorist must also argue for realism about colors and other
represented properties.
14Artiga writes: “Since P1 and P2 seem to be priori and C is clearly a posteriori, if we accept
that P1-[(REAL)] entail C, we will be entitled to conclude a substantive and a posteriori claim
about the world (color realism) from certain a priori claims and teleosemantics. I think this
is precisely what worries Mendelovici. . . ” (2013: 277)
15In Mendelovici 2013, I write: “The trouble is not that tracking theories allow us to infer
a posteriori truths from a priori truths, but rather that they allow us to make inferences that
it seems we should not be able to make, whether or not any of the premises we use are a
posteriori.” (440)
Artiga acknowledges that I deny that my worry concerns moving from a priori premises to
a posteriori conclusions, but interprets the following passage from my paper as nonetheless
supporting his interpretation: “But if tracking theories are correct, then in order to establish
realism about represented property P , we needn’t check the world for evidence of instances
of P . We can instead check ourselves for nonsemantically successful instances of the repre-
sentation of P .” (2013: 437-8) It might sound like my claim that, on the tracking theory, “we
needn’t check the world for evidence of instances of P” in order to draw realist conclusions
about P means that the tracking theory allows us to draw realist conclusions about P without
checking the world at all, i.e., a priori. But being able to draw realist conclusions about P
without checking the world for P is compatible with having to check the world for something
in order to drawing realist conclusions about P . What we have to check the world for is the
truth of (P1) and (P2), which, as I claim in my paper, does not require checking the world
for P .
16Like Millikan, Artiga takes introspective knowledge of our own mental states to count
as a priori, so Artiga’s disagreement with me over whether such introspective knowledge is a
24
is a posteriori because it is also known through experience; the fact that it is
uncontroversial does not make it a priori. The problem is not that a posteriori
conclusions can be drawn from a priori premises, but that questions of realism
can be settled on the basis of a theory of mental representation and a posteriori
but fairly innocuous and easily justified claims like (P1) and (P2).
Nevertheless, Artiga’s response to his apparent misconstrual of my argument
can also be offered as a response to the argument I actually make. His response is
that once we appreciate the kind of empirical examination required to establish
(P1) and (P2), it should not be surprising or objectionable that a theory of
mental representation allows us to conclude from them that color realism is
true:
Teleosemantics is an externalist theory about content, so P1 and P2
are a posteriori claims through and through. What kind of property
I am representing with a red experience and what kind of situations
are nonsemantically successful conditions (i.e. what sort of situations
accounted for the selection of the mechanism) are hard empirical
questions that should be resolved by science. Consequently, even if
teleosemantics is right, a considerable amount of empirical knowl-
edge must be gathered before anything like C can be established.
(2013: 278)
In order for this kind of response to successfully respond to the argument I ac-
tually made, it should show that establishing the conjunction of (P1) and (P2)
requires establishing that color properties are instantiated through normal, pre-
sumably empirical, methods. We should be clear that everyone should grant
that there are ways of establishing (P1) and (P2) that would proceed via estab-
lishing that color properties are instantiated—for instances, we could establish
priori is likely merely terminological.
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that (P2) is true by establishing that in nonsemantically successful conditions,
color properties are instantiated and then establishing that we find ourselves
in such nonsemantically successful conditions. But the question is not whether
there are ways of establishing either (P1) or (P2) that proceed via first estab-
lishing color realism, but rather whether there are ways of establishing (P1) and
(P2) that do not require first establishing color realism. I claimed that there
are.
Let us consider both premises separately to see if there is reason to think that
establishing either premise requires establishing color realism. For teleoseman-
tics, a representation’s nonsemantically successful conditions are what we might
call its design conditions, the type of conditions in which the representation’s
occurrence in our ancestors helped them survive and reproduce. Now, one way
of establishing that we represent colors in design conditions is by first finding
out precisely what the relevant design conditions are and then establishing that
we represent colors in those conditions. This way of establishing (P2) would
indeed involve establishing color realism prior to accepting (P2), since design
conditions would have to involve the instantiation of color properties. (This is
the way Artiga seems to have in mind when he says in the above quotation that
“what kind of situations are nonsemantically successful conditions (i.e. what
sort of situations accounted for the selection of the mechanism)” is an empirical
question to be settled by science.) However, another way of establishing that
we represent colors in design conditions is by first establishing that representing
colors aids us in our survival and reproduction in reliable and systematic ways
and then inferring from this that being in the same kinds of states helped our
ancestors in the same ways. Unlike the way Artiga seems to have in mind, this
perfectly good way of establishing (P2) does not require that we first establish
color realism.
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Let us now turn to (P1). Does establishing (P1) require first establishing
that color realism is true? There are several ways of establishing what we rep-
resent without first having to establish that what we represent is true, exists,
or is instantiated. Perhaps the most obvious way comes from introspection:
In some cases, introspection affords us access to the contents of our represen-
tational states; it tells us which contents we represent. The case of conscious
representational states, such as conscious thoughts or perceptual experiences
representing redness, seem to be good candidates for states that allow for this
kind of introspective access. It is important to note that none of this requires
that introspection can reveal the content of all mental representations (perhaps
we have non-conscious representations that are introspectively inaccessible), or
that introspection is an infallible guide to content. All that is required is that,
in some cases, introspection provides us fairly good evidence that we represent
certain contents. Assuming the case of color representation is one of those cases,
then this is enough to establish (P1), the claim that we represent colors.17
Artiga (and Millikan) reject the claim that introspection provides special ac-
cess to representational states, so they would not accept this way of establishing
(P1).18 I think this position is overly skeptical about introspection. That I rep-
17This also does not require that introspection can reveal the metaphysical nature of mental
representational states or their contents. See Mendelovici forthcoming, MS: ch. 1, where I
argue that introspection can at least sometimes tell us which contents we represent without
revealing to us their metaphysical nature (e.g., whether they are sets of possible worlds or
structured propositions) or the metaphysical nature of mental representation in general (e.g.,
whether it is a tracking relation, a relation to abstract entities, a relation to sense data, or a
non-relational state of subjects).
18As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, a central part of Millikan’s view is the denial of
what she calls “meaning rationalism,” which includes the view that introspection and intuition
provide insight into the contents of our representational states (see especially Millikan 1984:
91-2 and 326-7). However, meaning rationalism involves a commitment to the infallibility of
introspection, which I do not need in order to make my argument.
Millikan’s own view of self-knowledge is, roughly, that knowledge of what our concepts
represent is a matter of our (fallible) abilities to tell that two thoughts represent the same
content (Millikan 2000: chs. 10 and 13). “Knowing what I am thinking of is being capable
of coidentifying . . . various of my thoughts with other thoughts of the same. It is being able
to distinguish thinking of a thing again from thinking of a different thing.” (Millikan 2000:
184) (See also Shea 2002 for an overview.) Millikan does claim that this picture is only “[t]he
closest thing that actually makes some sense . . . to the yearned-for ideal of comparison of
a thought with its object bare within thought itself” (2000: 184), but it is not clear that it
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resent colors is immediately obvious to me. I need not consider my dispositions
to make inferences or behave, or my social or physical environment in order to
know that I represent colors. That we represent colors is a datum, one that a
theory of mental representation has to explain. Further, one might argue, it is
through introspection that we get a grip on mental representation in the first
place, and this way of getting a grip on mental representation automatically
affords us some pre-theoretic access to mental representational states. But this
is not the place to argue for these claims.19 Instead, let me turn to another
way in which we can find out about the contents of our representational states
without introspecting upon them: by observing their psychological roles.20
Mental representational states play certain psychological roles, including
roles in inference, behavior, and the formation of higher-order thoughts about
comes close at all, since it only seems to deliver knowledge that two concepts represent the
same unknown thing, and knowing that two concepts represent the same content does not
help you know what that content is if you have no prior access to either thought’s content.
The kind of knowledge we obtain is analogous to the knowledge we obtain by learning that
two words whose meaning we do not know are synonymous.
19See Mendelovici 2010: ch. 2, MS: ch 1.
20Artiga’s rejection of introspection involves conceding that externalist views like teleose-
mantics are in tension with introspective self-knowledge. He suggests that this tension shows
there is nothing new about my argument, since we already knew that externalist theories
like teleosemantics are in tension with introspective self-knowledge (2013: 278). Of course,
that externalism is incompatible with introspective self-knowledge is not what my argument
intends to show. My argument assumes a premise that is accepted by most participants on
the debates concerning introspective self-knowledge, which is that there is such a thing as in-
trospective self-knowledge, and attempts to show that together with other assumptions, this
gives rise to consequences concerning color realism and other forms of realism. My overall
argument is meant to show that clean cases of reliable misrepresentation are incompatible
with tracking theories of mental representation and that this is a problem for them. So, my
argument does not boil down to pointing out the tension between externalism and introspec-
tive self-knowledge. More generally, when one responds to an argument by biting a bullet,
one cannot conclude that the aim of the argument was to establish the bullet.
Artiga also suggests that if the worry boils down to a worry about the compatibility of
tracking theories with introspective self-knowledge, then it is a problem for any externalist
theory, not just teleosemantics or tracking theories more generally, so “a defense will have to
come from externalism, rather than from teleosemantics.” (2013: 278) Of course, a problem for
everyone is not a problem for no one, so, to the extent to which accommodating introspective
self-knowledge is a problem for externalism, it is a problem for tracking theories, including
teleosemantics. In any case, tracking theories are the main contenders for externalist theories
of meaning, so even if my argument did boil down to pointing out the tension between exter-
nalism and self-knowledge, and even if a problem for all versions of a theory is not a problem
for any specific version of that theory, the worry would still be a fair one to raise against my
target, which is tracking theories in general.
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them. For example, from representing that some object has a particular color,
we are likely to represent that it doesn’t have certain other colors, that it is
a visible object, and that it is similar to or different from other objects. We
might utter certain words, like “This is red,” or approach or move away from
it. We might form a higher-order thought with the content I am thinking about
a red tomato. From these and other facts like them, we can hone in on the
content of color representations without requiring us to know whether colors
are in fact instantiated. Again, this method does not need to be foolproof in
order to provide sufficient evidence for (P1).21
More generally, the tracking theorist should accept that there is a theory-
independent way of finding out what we represent, a way that doesn’t require
first finding out what we track on their favored tracking theory. As long as this
way does not require establishing realism about represented properties, we have
a way of establishing (P1) independent of establishing realism about redness,
and we have an argument for color realism that bypasses the normal ways of
finding out whether realism is true. I will return to this point shortly.
We don’t know that we represent through introspection. Artiga argues
that the rejection of color realism is compatible with teleosemantics and the
validity of the argument from (P1), (P2), and (REAL) to (C):
[I]f we assume teleosemantics and grant everything I accepted in this
paper (including the inference from P1-[REAL] to C), is teleoseman-
21One might object that knowing that we make inferences with a certain content or have
higher-order thoughts requires introspection of that content, so although this method allows
us to avoid introspection upon the representational states we want to know about, it does not
avoid introspection entirely. I agree that the most natural ways of finding one whether you
are making a particular inference is to introspect, and the most natural way of finding out
whether someone else is making an inference with a particular content is to ask them whether
they are, which will prompt them to introspect and then report on what they find. This
dependence on introspection of the most natural way of finding out about what inferences we
make illustrates the far-reaching consequences of rejecting introspection. But presumably the
skeptic about introspection will allow that there are other ways of finding out about what
inferences we make, perhaps through our behaviors. Something similar can be said for how
we know about our higher-order states.
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tics still compatible with color eliminativism? It clearly is. If sci-
ence discovers that there is nothing our color experiences have been
tracking, then teleosemantics has to say that the mechanism that
produces our color experiences is not a representational mechanism.
That is, it is possible that color experiences are not representational
states. (2013: 278)
The suggestion is that we could discover that our color experiences don’t bear
the relevant tracking relation to anything at all, and so, we could discover that
we don’t represent colors after all. (P1) would then be false, which would block
the argument to color realism (which would also be false) in a way that is fully
compatible with teleosemantics.
However, the same considerations that support the claim that color repre-
sentations represent colors also support the weaker claim that they represent
something. We can know from introspection that our representations of redness
are not empty, that they in fact have contents. It is introspectively obvious that
we think something when we think about colors. (This is something that Artiga
and Millikan would deny. But surely the psychological role of color representa-
tions or other considerations that do not require realism about colors can help
establish that color representations represent something.)
Incidentally, the suggestion that our (pseudo-)representations do not repre-
sent anything at all has unwanted consequences for the tracking theorist. While
it allows her to deny color realism, it does so at the cost of making color anti-
realism unthinkable if true. If there are no colors, and if our color “concepts”
(or whatever we use to apparently think about colors) are supposed to get their
content through tracking, then we would have no concept of color, and the
thought color realism is false would not be thinkable.22 We would not be able
22The only way to avoid this consequence would to be to claim that color (pseudo-)concepts
are obtained not through tracking, but through composition of other representations that do
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to represent to ourselves what it is that does not exist. Note that we cannot
deny the existence of colors by justing thinking to ourselves that our “color”
(pseudo-)representations fail to represent, since there is nothing that makes
them pertain to colors, so, again, this thought will fail to tell us what it is that
does not exist. One way to see this is to note that the thought that our (pseudo-
)representations fail to represent is fully compatible with the existence of colors.
Color anti-realism being unstatable if true is clearly absurd and a high price to
pay to block the argument from (P1), (P2), and (REAL) to (C).23,24
Artiga’s suggestion that teleosemantics can allow us to discover that we don’t
represent colors comes dangerously close to the claim that what we represent
should be settled by theory, a claim that is problematic regardless of what we
think about introspective self-knowledge. While some cases of mental represen-
tation might have to be settled by theory, many cases are such that we have
some kind of theory-independent access to them. Tracking theories are theories
of mental representation, not just theories about certain kinds of tracking re-
track something. But it does not seem that we represent colors from composition. In any
case, we could run the same argument with some other (pseudo-)concept that is supposed to
get its content directly from tracking.
23An anonymous reviewer has suggested that empty (pseudo-)representations might be cases
of reliable misrepresentation, and so that taking color (pseudo-)representations to be empty
would be a way for teleosemantics to allow for the reliable misrepresentation of color. However,
empty (pseudo-)representations are not a kind of reliable misrepresentation, since reliable
misrepresentation requires representation (by (RM1)), and empty (pseudo-)representations
do not represent. Further, reliable misrepresentation requires falsity (by (RM2)), and empty
(pseudo-)representations are arguably neither true nor false, since representing falsely requires
representing.
24One might suggest that there is a difference between representing and seeming to represent
(see Millikan 1984: 326-7). Perhaps all we can conclude from introspection and considerations
of psychological role is that our color representations seem to represent colors. I’m not sure
how to understand this claim other than as the claim that we represent that we represent
colors. But then this suggestion faces the following dilemma: Either representing that we
represent P requires representing P or it does not. (Representing that we represent P will
require representing P on views of higher-order states on which lower-order states or their
contents are embedded or otherwise involved in the higher-order states (see, e.g., Burge 1988),
but such views of higher-order states are not mandatory.) If representing that we represent
P requires representing P , then we can establish (P1) from the fact that we represent that
we represent colors. If it does not, then this is presumably because the content representing
P is not composed of other contents. But then we can run an amended the argument from
(P1), (P2), and (REAL), to (C) where “redness” is replaced with “representing redness” and
“colors” is replaced with “the representing of colors.” Since this response accepts that we
represent that we represent redness, it should accept that the new version of (P1) is true.
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lations. This is why they are in competition with one another and with other
theories of mental representation. Tracking theories aim at a certain target,
mental representation, and attempt to account for it. While there are different
ways of fixing reference on our target25, we need to have some sort of theory-
independent grip on it in order for the disagreement between different tracking
theories, and different theories of mental representation more generally, to be a
genuine disagreement.26 If we had no theory-independent grip on mental repre-
sentation, then teleosemantics and other kinds of tracking theories would not be
in disagreement. They would each be theories of their favored kinds of tracking
relations and nothing more. They might disagree on which tracking relations
are most important, or which are useful for certain purposes, but they needn’t
be in competition with one another. All the tracking relations they specify
could peacefully co-exist. Since tracking theorists seem to take their theories to
be in competition, they should accept that they have a common target, which
requires that there is a theory-independent way of fixing on this target.
With our theory-independent grip on mental representation come theory-
independent ways of finding out what certain mental states represent. These
ways might be based on introspection, intuition, or observations of inferences,
brain states, or behaviors. Indeed, tracking theorists seem to accept that we have
a theory-independent way of finding out about mental contents. This is clear
in their discussions of the disjunction problem. The disjunction problem arises
when a theory of mental representation incorrectly assigns disjunctive contents
(e.g., horse or skinny-cow-on-a-dark-night) to mental representations that don’t
have disjunctive contents (e.g., horse) (see Fodor 1987: ch. 4). In order for the
disjunction problem to actually be a problem, we need a theory-independent
25See Mendelovici MS: ch. 1 for discussion.
26In my view, our theory-independent grip on mental representation comes from introspec-
tion (see Mendelovici 2010: ch. 2, MS: ch. 1, Kriegel 2011: ch. 1). Other views are that it
comes from folk psychology or cognitive science (see, e.g.,Fodor 1987).
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way of knowing that the content of the relevant mental representations is not
in fact disjunctive. Otherwise, we could just accept that certain theories claim
that certain (or all) contents are disjunctive. That tracking theorists tend not
to bite the bullet on the disjunction problem shows that they accept that there
are ways of finding out what a mental representation represents independent
of a theory of mental representation. Based on discussions of the disjunction
problem, these ways seem to be largely based on intuition and introspection;
it’s supposed to just be obvious that horse doesn’t represent horse or skinny-
cow-on-a-dark-night.
All this is relevant to the argument for realism in two ways. First, this means
that teleosemantics (or any theory of mental representation) is not free to dictate
the contents of our mental states. We have theory-independent ways of finding
out what we represent. While some cases of mental representation might have
to be settled solely based on our theory, in many cases, pre-theoretical consider-
ations constrain or completely inform us as to what is represented. In the case of
perceptual experiences of colors and thoughts about colors, it is pre-theoretically
clear that the relevant representations represent something. Suggesting that a
tracking theory could inform us that we don’t represent anything is no more
convincing than suggesting it could inform us that horse represents horse or
skinny-cow-on-a-dark-night. Tracking theorists should not bite the bullet on
such cases, because biting these bullets is in tension with acknowledging that
we have a theory-independent way of finding out what our mental representa-
tions represent, and denying that we have a theory-independent way of finding
out what our mental representations represent is in tension with taking tracking
theories of mental representation to actually be theories of mental representa-
tion.27
27It is not clear that the kind of self-knowledge provided by Millikan’s theory (see fn. 18)
provides us us the kind of theory-independent grip on mental representation required to ad-
judicate disagreements between different theories of mental representation on independent
33
Second, as long as the theory-independent ways of finding out what a repre-
sentation represents don’t require ascertaining that realism about a candidate
represented property is true, tracking theories will license unacceptable argu-
ments from premises like (P1) and (P2) to (C). In other words, even if we don’t
know (P1) through introspection, as I claim we do, we will still be able to by-
pass the standard considerations for ascertaining realism about a represented
property as long as we are able to establish (P1) without checking the surfaces
of objects. So, tracking theories license inappropriate consequences even if we
deny introspective self-knowledge. Denying introspective self-knowledge is not
enough to make moves licensed by (REAL) palatable; one must also deny other
theory-independent ways of finding out what our mental representations repre-
sent. But denying that we have theory-independent ways of finding out what
our mental representations represent is in tension with taking tracking theories
grounds. Millikan’s theory of self-knowledge is a theory of how we come to know that two
representations track the same thing, so it seems the insight it takes self-knowledge to pro-
vide ends up being insights onto what is tracked. If it turned out that her method delivered
results that were at odds with her tracking theory, then presumably she would claim that her
method delivered a mistake; after all, this method aims to find out whether we track the same
thing on multiple occasions, so if its results come apart from what we in fact do track, we
can conclude that it has made a mistake. This means that her method does not provide an
independent means of validating the predictions of her theory; we could never use it find out
that her theory was false.
Pietroski 1992 provides an imaginary case aimed at testing Millikan’s teleosemantics on
independent grounds: He asks us to imagine two species, kimus, and their only predators,
snorfs. Kimus were originally color-blind, but by random mutation, one kimu has a represen-
tation R that is tokened in the presence of red light. In the morning, red light emanates from
the top of a hill. Evolution eventually selected kimus that were fond of red light and hence
would climb the hill every morning, thereby avoiding being eaten by snorfs, which happen to
not be able to climb hills. Pietroski claims that Millikan’s theory delivers the wrong result
in this case: Her account predicts that R represents the lack of snorfs, a snorf-free zone, or
something else to do with snorfs, but, he claims, whether R is a representation of red light,
redness, something nice, or something else, one thing it certainly is not a representation of
is anything to do with snorfs. In making this argument, Pietroski assumes that we have an
independent way of knowing the contents of representational states (his favored way appeals
to the role of mental representation in psychological explanations). Millikan bites the bul-
let on this objection, claiming that R does indeed represent something to do with snorfs.
But if Pietroski’s case does not count as evidence against teleosemantics from independent
considerations pertaining to the content of representational states, it is not clear does.
See also Mendelovici and Bourget 2014, which argues that a naturalistic approach to mental
representation requires more than reducing mental representation to the physical; it also
requires being compatible with the theory-independent empirical evidence concerning what a
representation represents.
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to actually be theories of mental representation.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve overviewed, clarified, and improved various aspects of my
argument from reliable misrepresentation against tracking theories. I’ve also
presented and responded to certain objections made in Artiga 2013. If my argu-
ments are sound, the argument from reliable misrepresentation escapes Artiga’s
objections, and tracking theories still need to allow for clean cases of mental
representation.
I will close by summarizing my complaint against tracking theories, and
against teleosemantics in particular, in an intuitive way: There could be cases
in which we keep track of some worldly property, A (say, surface reflectance
profiles), but we do this by representing “to ourselves” something else, B (say,
primitive colors). Perhaps we need to keep track of A, but we do not need to
know just what property it is, so it does not matter whether it is A or B that
we represent. It might even be easier or more economical for us to represent
B rather than A, perhaps because A is highly complex, while B is not. All
this could be as it should be by any standard other than veridicality: the setup
could be useful for us and our ancestors, and it could result is as strong a
connection between our representations and B as we please. It need not be an
accident or a byproduct of some other of our useful features. Teleosemantics,
and tracking theories in general, inappropriately rule out this possibility on the
basis of theory alone. But it is a live empirical possibility, one that should be
left open by any theory, especially one claiming to be naturalistic.28
28Thanks to David Bourget, Marc Artiga, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
ments on previous drafts of this paper.
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